Gorden and Dorothea had a child while living together in 1985. They married in 1986, and divorced in 1993 when the child was 8 years old. They stipulated to a divorce acknowledging that Gorden was the father. In 1996, Dorothea moved to Virginia and the child stayed with Gorden. On March 9, 1998, a DNA test established Gorden was not the father. Nevertheless, on March 25, 1998, Gorden signed an agreement obligating him to pay for 60% of the child's college costs. In June of 1998, Gorden agreed the child could live with Dorothea in Virginia. A new stipulation was filed providing that Gorden was not the child's father, and had no legal or physical rights and responsibilities for the child, but did not make any specific provision concerning the college payment.

In 2003, Dorothea sued to have Gorden pay for the child's college. She argued the latest agreement didn't clearly void the college obligation. Justices Reiber, Skoglund and Burgess agreed. Justices Dooley and Johnson dissented saying the agreements clearly intended to relieve Gorden of the college expense.

The majority wrote that the dissenters' view of the case derived from a basic harsh philosophy - that a man who had cared for a child for many years wouldn't want to support her even if he wasn't the father. This they said made their position "incoherent."

The dissenters wrote they were not motivated by any "harsh philosophy" and were certainly not "incoherent." They pointed out that Gorden had manifested his intent to be excused from the college obligation in many ways and the agreement should be read to carry out that intent.

Interesting: three Supreme Court Justices can read an agreement and find it clearly says one thing, while two justices say it clearly means something else. (I suspect no lawyers were involved in drafting the agreement, an oversight which will cost Gorden at least $75,000). The usual Conservative vs. Liberal lens of evaluating the reasons for a result does not explain this case. The two female justices frequently vote together on family law issues. Justice Burgess usually agrees with Chief Justice Reiber. Justice Dooley is not as predictable. I suspect the two camps were genuinely puzzled over what the parties intended to do. Or, perhaps, the majority was appalled that Gorden would turn his back on a child he had nurtured while the dissenters felt he had been duped all along and should get some relief. Anything written, as well as seen, derives meaning from the personality of the observer. Dorothea O'Connell-Starkey v. Gorden S. Starkey 2007 VT 128.